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A Refresher Course in Cause
J. Denson Smith*
One of the most significant and perhaps troublesome problems that will confront the drafters of a Projet of a Revised
Civil Code, as envisioned by Act 335 of 1948, will be what to do
about the doctrine of cause in Louisiana's contract law. This will
necessarily involve also deciding what to do about consideration
that, aided by a fifth column operating from the code itself, has
infiltrated from the common law. Available choices will include
whether to retain our traditional doctrine with an infusion of
new vigor afforded chiefly by pruning away the confusing
admixture of consideration; whether to yield to the latter doctrine as a substitute; or whether simply to undertake to avoid
any mention of cause and set up rules designed to make its
application unnecessary.
It may be admitted at the outset that we can get along
without cause if we want to. Other jurisdictions that have drawn
their law from the civilian well presumably have done so.' Yet
we cannot get away from the problems that must be solved by
the application of principles rooted deep in the essence of cause.
Not at all likely is it that we will ever believe that all undertakings should be treated alike, whether purely gratuitous or
supported by an equivalent, or that no account should be taken
of error, fraud, violence or threats. 2 If this be true, whatever
solutions are proposed it will still be necessary to deal with distinctions stemming from such differences in treatment and from
the necessity sometimes of granting relief against obligations
assumed. To a considerable extent at common law such problems involve the doctrine of consideration. The law we inherited
employs the theory of cause. The purpose of this paper is to
explore in some detail the manner in which cause operates in
the solution of contract problems of the sort indicated in the hope
that such an examination may add a degree of understanding to
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See Viforeanu, Contribution A L'Ptude du Contrat dans le Projet
Franco-Italien et en Droit Compar6 464 (1932).
2. See generally Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553
(1933).
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the concept so that its proper place in the law of Louisiana may
be better understood.
It seems clear that the most fruitful way to get at an understanding of cause is to determine just how it fits into the civilian
law of contract and how it operates in the solution of contract
problems. Great argument can be discovered among civilian
writers insisting in opposition that cause is on the one hand an
objective concept and on the other entirely subjective. 3 The
effort here will be to point up its controlling influence in characterizing promises so that their proper legal treatment may be
known and to explore its application to the problem of deciding
what circumstances should be legally sufficient to justify the
granting of relief to promisors who have been affected thereby.
Although a detailed comparison of civilian cause and common law consideration is not an object of this discussion, yet, as
a consequence of the confusing use of both terms in our Civil
Code, and because in many important aspects the two doctrines
operate to fulfill much the same purpose, comparison cannot entirely be escaped. For much of this we may give thanks to our
exposure to common law influences and learning, the impact
upon us of common law practices, customs and habits, and also
to the rendition in English of our code by a translator who, one
may surmise, had either little regard for or understanding of the
French theory of cause as well as manifest misconceptions of
Anglo-American consideration, at least as we understand it
4
today.
-CONTRACT IN FRENCH LAW

General Principles
As one writer has put it, "The fundamental principle of
modem civil law is that conventio without more = contractus.
But it must be conventio about a lawful subject matter." 5 On
the other hand, the American Law Institute's comment on consideration in its Restatement of Contracts begins, "No duty is
3. See 2 Planiol, Trait6 2lmentaire de Droit Civil 391-398, nos 1026-1039
(11 ed. 1939); Louis-Lucas, Volonte et Cause 122-134 (1918).
4. "The definition relied on from the English side of one of the articles
of the Code proves nothing but the ignorance of the person who translated
it from the French." Edgerton v. Third Municipality, 1 La. Ann. 435, 437
(1846). See also Dubuisson, The Codes of Louisiana (Originals written in
French, Errors of Translation) 25 La. Bar Ass'n Rep. 143 (1924).
5. Walton, Cause and Consideration in Contracts, 41 L.Q. Rev. 306 (1925).
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generally imposed on one who makes an informal promise unless
the promise is supported by consideration."6
The basic difference between civilian cause and common
law consideration rests in these principles. In the civil law,
agreement without more equals contract, as long as the agreement is a lawful one. In Anglo-American common law, agreement plus consideration equals contract. One theory subscribes
to the view that a promise should be enforced because it is a
promise, the other holds to the belief that a promise should not
be enforced unless the promisor asks for and receives something
in return for it.
How the French came to hold their view is not difficult to
discover. With the Romans, formality occupied great place in
the law of contract. But canonical law, as early as the thirteenth
century, taught respect for the will of man. This theory was
echoed by the philosophers. Individual liberty and freedom
became the rallying call of the French revolution. The drafters
of the Code Napoleon recognized this philosophy and gave it life
by exalting the will of the individual however expressed. Requirements of form were viewed in general as unnecessary
obstacles to free expression. The power to bind oneself merely by
expressing a will to do so was accorded full recognition. Given
the required capacity, the parties with certain exceptions might
contract as to all things, in the most extensive sense of the
7
expression, corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable.
All agreements legally entered into were given the effect of laws
on those who made them. A promise was enforceable because
it was a manifestation of the promisor's will to be bound, and no
further reason was required.8
Cause and Contract Characterization
From a beginning such as this the role of cause in modern
civilian law unfolds with reasonable clarity. In consequence of
the fact that in French law a promisor can bind himself by his
will alone, cause is merely concerned with his reason for doing
so. There can be no such thing as a promise without a cause in
civilian law in the sense that there can be a promise without
6. Restatement, Contracts § 75, Comment a (1932).
7. 6 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais no 14
(1930).
8. Id. at no 95; 3 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais no 17 (1833); Planiol,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 363-364, 371-374, nos 945, 962-974.
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5

consideration in Anglo-American law, for a manifestation of will
must necessarily derive from some motive, reason, or grounds.
Whereas consideration is something given for a promise, promise and cause are as inherently joined as the spoken word with
the thought creating it.9 Hence the accurate identification of
cause with motive.
The place occupied by cause in French law can be stated in
major outline with reasonable brevity. The principle that all
promises intended to have legal effect are enforceable is carried
out very simply and directly. An expression by one person of a
will to bind himself, when concurred in by another, constitutes
a concurrence of wills, or contract. The latter term includes,
therefore, not only agreements having some commercial significance for the parties but donations as well, since a 'donation is
completed by the concurrence of the will of the donee in accepting, as with any other contract. 10 Contracts, consequently, are
given two general classifications based on the motive for making
them: contracts of beneficence and contracts under onerous
title. Cause is as germane to the former as to the latter; indeed,
it is the determining element." Whether a contract is an onerous
contract or gratuitous depends in the final analysis on its cause.
If a contractant desires to confer a benefit by way of gratuity
the resulting contract is gratuitous. Where he is not so moved
the contract is onerous. Certain special contracts such as the
loan of money without interest, the non-remunerative suretyship,
mandate and deposit, and the loan for use are therefore characterized as gratuitous. In all these cases a benefit is conferred
without anything being asked for or received in return. But by
far the most important gratuitous contract that meets this test
is the donation. And there is a very significant difference between
it and the others-it occasions a depletion of patrimony on the
9. Travaux de la Commission de R~forme du Code Civil 49 (1947-1948):
M. Latournerie, "... . en ce sens, on ne peut parler de fausse cause: tous
le8 actes, hors ceux du fou, mdme les actes dits 'gratuits', ont une cause."
M. Houin, ". . . Il est dvident, en outre, qu'dla lumindre de cetee analyse,
Pabsence de cause est une chose 4nconcevable. Il convient, enftn, de noter
qu'il n'est pas exact de parler de cause du contrat ou de l'acte juridique; il
I'est davantage de parler de cause de 5"obligation; mais Pexpression la plus
correcte serait celle de 'cause de la manifestation de volontd de l'auteur ou
de Pun des auteurs de l'acte."
Billette, La Cause des Obligations et Prestations 65 (1933): "L'acte du
donateur n'est pas l'acte d'un insensd. II a un cause."
10. 7 Fenet, Recueil Complet des Travaux Pr~paratoires du Code Civil
595 (1836); Bufnoir, Propri6t6 et Contrat 6 (2 ed. 1924).
11. Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at no 32.
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part of the donor. Because of this, donations are subjected to
special rules (including the requirement of the authentic form)
not applicable to onerous contracts or to the special gratuitous
contracts mentioned.
Since of all contracts, donations alone are subjected to these
special rules, their identification becomes necessary. A complicating factor is the fact that in French law a donation may consist of a promise of future performance as well as a present
delivery of something tangible. This is a natural result of the
free scope given to the individual will and the resulting power
to bind oneself by making a promise or declaration of intent to
do so. With respect to such promises, although it was considered desirable to require the use of an authentic act to guard
against ill-considered generosity, as well as attempts to prove
the intent to be bound by more questionable evidence, it was
not deemed necessary to go further and insist on a present real
12
delivery as an additional safeguard.
The French Code defines a donation inter vivos as "an act
by which the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably,
of the thing given, in favor of the donee who accepts it.' 3 The
settled view of the courts and the writers is that the word "act"
in the text is inexact in that it signifies a juridical result pro4
duced by the will of one person acting alone, as a testament.1
It is also generally agreed that the divestiture spoken of in the
article includes the transfer of a "right" to the donee, without
regard to its nature. The "thing given" is thus this right. 'From
this it follows that there may be a donation of a right to a sum
of money, the real transfer of which is to be made in the future,
which amounts to the gratuitous creation of a right in the donee
against the donor to a sum equal to the amount promised. In
such a case it is considered that the donation does not have for
its object the sum of money but rather the right to require payment in the future, that is, an enforceable credit created in the
donee. The "thing" then, of which the donor divests himself
12. 12 Laurent, Principes 281-283, nos 220-221 (4 ed., Brux., 1887).
13. Art. 894, French Civil Code.
14. The word "act" got into the article without much discussion to meet
the objection that a contract imposes mutual charges on the two contracting
parties. 7 Fenet, op. cit. supra note 10, at 260. Cf. 8 Oeuvres de Pothier 347
and note (2 ed., Buguet, 1861).
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irrevocably in favor of the donee who accepts it, is the right or
credit thereby vested in the latter. 15
In the final analysis, whether a contract is a donation or an
onerous contract depends upon the determining motive that
dominated the party. Basically a donation stems from an intent
to give as opposed to an intent to secure something in return or
to discharge an obligation, hence the statement that the cause
of a donation is the animus donandi. Its legal character therefore
depends upon its cause.
At first blush it would appear to be a simple thing to distinguish between donations and onerous contracts. But the same
types of cases are the trouble makers here that keep pounding
against the bulwark of bargain in Anglo-American consideration.
The real difficulty is bottomed on the fact that underlying every
act of man there may be a complexity of motives, so that the
final or determining motive may become difficult of discovery.
An examination of some of the problem cases will be helpful.
We are all familiar with so-called charitable subscriptions.
Common law courts working with the doctrine of consideration
were faced with the difficulty of finding some sort of bargain to
support promises to subscribe. This was a real difficulty because
the subscriber for charitable purposes is not seeking a return
performance the receipt of which is his inducement to subscribe.
Trying to find something bargained for and given in exchange for
the promise required uncommon legal adroitness even for a
willing court. But it was done.' 6 From the French point of view,
subscriptions for charitable purposes present the question of
whether they are donations or onerous contracts. If the former,
the use of the authentic form would be required for their enforceability. But such a result would be undesirable because in most
cases the amounts promised are small and the subscribers numerous. In applying the concept of cause, inquiry can be made as
to whether the promisor acted from a pure spirit of liberality or
whether he was trying to achieve a desired end by supporting
or perpetuating the organization as an institution beneficial to
the society of which he is a part. It has not been difficult for the
French to resolve the question by holding that the cause in such
15. Id. at 376.
16. See Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173, 57 A.L.R. 980 (1927). The opinion contains
also a good collection of the cases.
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a case is not a will to give or spirit of liberality but rather the
intention of arriving at the end sought, the creation or perpetua17
tion of an agency in which the subscriber is interested. From
this the holding follows that the transaction is not a donation
requiring an authentic act for enforceability. And it is likely
that this comes -closer to the substance of the matter than, say,
a finding of consideration in the promises of other subscribers.
Some similarity can be detected between the foregoing and the
approach of common law courts when bargain bent, but the
theory of cause is certainly more realistic, even if the final
difference is between saying that a subscriber is bargaining as
opposed to saying that he is not donating.'8
Similar problems are presented by cases involving promises
made in recognition of past benefits received, the common law
"past consideration" cases. A common law court can hardly find
a present bargain for a past benefit, but in civilian law the basic
question is whether the promisor is being moved by a spirit of
liberality or by a sense of obligation. The resolution of this
problem is sometimes dealt with in terms of natural obligations,
but, as one would suspect, the Code Napoleon does not define
natural obligations. The character they may give to future promises or transfers is left for determination through an application
of the theory of cause. And the courts have acted accordingly.
It is generally recognized that one who acts in response to a
natural obligation is not dominated by an intention to give arising
from a spirit of liberality and is, it follows, not donating. One
writer has stated the views of the judges as derived from the
cases: "Whoever fulfills a moral duty feels himself obligated
by his conscience, he feels himself morally bound; he does not
act under the influence of a pure sentiment of affection for a
third person. He admits himself to be a debtor, thereby excluding
on his part any intention to make a liberality.... Each time the
courts decide to admit the existence of a natural obligation they
simply ask whether he who has paid had reason to believe him17. 2 Colin et Capitant, Droit Civil Francais 59, no 61 (8 ed. '1935);

5

Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at no 418; Billette, op. cit. supra note 9.
at no 190.
18. This Is a significant difference for although a finding of donation

must exclude the possibility of bargain a finding of no bargain does not
necessarily mean donation. At common law the promises, that fall in between
are not supported by consideration and are generally unenforceable whereap
at civil law such promises, not being donations, are enforceable without anv
formal requirements.
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self bound by a duty of conscience and to be obligated morally;
and when they recognize this duty they say: There was a natural
obligation ....
The act designated as donation must then have
no other motive than sentiment of affection."1' 9 It is in this fashion that the French dispose of the kinds of promises recognized
by the American Law Institute as being enforceable without
consideration as well as all kinds of "past consideration" cases,
whether they involve past receipt of pecuniary benefits or those
20
of a moral nature.
The similarity of the problem raised by such cases from the
civilian and common law viewpoints might here be noticed.
The French, being concerned solely with whether they are or
are not dealing with a donation, draw the line between pure
donations and onerous contracts back at the point where there
is a pure spirit of liberality. Anglo-Americans, being concerned
with bargain, go up to present exchange and draw it there. The
focus of the French is on donation and that of Anglo-Americans
on bargain with the result that more simple promises are enforceable in the civilian system than in the common law. And this
seems to flow directly from the French emphasis on the legal
potency of the expressed will as opposed to the stricter common
law view that a man's promise should not bind him unless he
asks for and gets something in return. French civilian law was
thus drawing its strength from the moral domain to a greater
extent than the common law where hard-headed practicality
was throwing its weight around.
CAUSE AND ERROR
Without giving more detailed consideration to the function
of cause in characterizing contractual obligations, the concept
plays an important role also in the resolution of questions involving the effect of error, duress and illegality. In this respect it is
well to recall to mind-the emphasis placed by the French on the
19. Planiol, Assimilation Progressive de l'obligation naturelle et du Devoir
Morale, 42 Rev. Crit. de Jur. 157 (1913). See also 2 Colin et Capitant, op. cit.
supra note 17, at nos 275-278.
20. A collection of French cases can be found in Schiller, The Counterpart of Consideration in Foreign Legal Systems, Report of New York Law

Revision Commission 107 (1936).

The cases clearly indicate that solution

depends upon (a) whether the services are measurable in money, and (b) the
correspondence in value between the services and the promised compensation.
It has been held that such a promise under private act is valid up to the
value of the services and invalid for the portion that amounts to a pure
liberality. S.1893.2.209.
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legal efficacy of the will, the great scope given to it and its elevation to the status of law made by the parties for themselves.
As a necessary corollary to the principle that an individual should
have the utmost freedom to bind himself by willing to do so, it
follows that he should not be bound without having so willed.
This results in the principle that where consent is given in error
-which covers also cases involving consent secured through
fraud, or duress, a real will to bind is lacking and the expression
of consent is thereby vitiated. Hence the rule that error as to
the principal cause of a contract destroys the validity of the
consent. Although different categories of error are dealt with,
such as error as to the object, or the person, or the cause, it has
been said, and with good reason, that error as to the cause com21
prehends all kinds of error.
If the law had to deal with the effect of error on only that
party whose consent was given as a consequence thereof it would
suffice simply to say that error will destroy consent only when
it is on so material a point it is clear that consent would not have
been given if the truth had been known. Such a rule would be
in clear consonance with the view that a contract derives from
the will to obligate which should be a true or real will. But
since there is no measurable limit to the diverse motives that may
play upon an individual, the effect of such a rule on the other
party must also be considered. The result is that distinctions
have to be made to afford proper protection, and this explains
the qualification that invalidating error must relate to the principal cause or motive. Considering the nature of the contract,
realization of the principal cause or motive is understood to be
the basis upon which consent is given and it therefore becomes
a tacit condition of the contract. This is because the final and
principal motive for assuming an obligation must lie in the obvious end being sought, for example, obtaining ownership, or use,
or services, or conferring a benefit. If this cause fails, the will
is vitiated and the contract falls. At the same time, if the particular motive is not discernible by the nature of the contract
it is subsidiary and does not rise to the status of a tacit condition
because the other party is not chargeable with knowledge that
the contract is conditioned on its realization. To be effective as
a condition, the parties must contract on that basis. 22 An example
21. Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 17, at no 38.
22. See Toullier, op. cit. supra note 8, at nos 37-42; Planiol et Ripert, op.

cit..supra note 7, at 226.

1951]

A REFRESHER COURSE IN CAUSE

of this may be found- in the rule that error as to the value of the
thing purchased and sold does not vitiate consent. Although a
buyer may not have bought if he had known the true value of
the thing, it should be presumed that he is taking his chanceand the seller is in like position-unless the agreement is conditioned on value.2 3 All that the seller is required to know is
that the buyer wants the thing being bought and sold, or supposedly so;24 why the buyer may want it, whether because of
its supposed value or for any other reason is not the seller's
concern if the parties do not contract on such basis. As the
French writers put it, error will serve to invalidate consent only
when it enters the contractual field. It does so tacitly if it relates
25
to the principal cause, that is, the final and determining motive.
Attempts to deal with this kind of problem result in dividing
cause into remote and proximate cause, or the cause of the contract as opposed to the cause of the obligation, or in undertaking
to separate cause and motive and to define the former, in an
abstract way, as the immediate end that a party has in view in
contracting. 26 Through such means the French try to accomplish the same sort of thing that is accomplished at common law
by means of the principles of materiality and mutuality. It is
true also that the legal effect of error may vary depending on
how seriously and to what extent each party may be injured by
a given solution and also on the presence, or absence of negligence.
Although simple error will render a contract invalid only
when it affects the principal or final and determining motive,
yet when it is occasioned by fraud, its effect is broadened to
result in nullity when the fraud practiced is such that it is evident that without it the other party would not have contracted. 27
Here, of course, the party practicing the fraud is in no position
23. The special rules dealing with lesion result from this.
24. This is the basis upon which rest the principles granting relief
against redhibitory defects rendering the thing sold either absolutely useless,
or its use so inconvenient and imperfect that it must be supposed the buyer
would not have purchased it if he had known of the vice. Art. 2520, La. Civil
Code of 1870.
25. Toullier, op. cit. supra note 8, at nos 37-42; Planiol et Ripert, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 226.
26. See 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, Trait6 Th6orique et Pratique
de Droit Civil, Des Obligations 338-41 (2 ed. 1907); Colin et Capitant, op. cit.
supra note 17, at nOS 57, 58; Travaux de la Commission de R~forme du Code
Civil 48-50, 266-274 (1947-48). Cf. Planiol, op. cit. supra note 3, at 403, no 1059.
27. Art. 1116, French Civil Code.
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to ask that the effect on himself of nullifying the contract be
considered, hence the broad rule may be applied as long as the
resulting error is material, even if it does not relate to the principal cause. 28 Violence has the same scope.
Beyond these cases cause also enters into the question of
legality. It is in this connection that much criticism of the doctrine has been voiced.
One may suppose a case where A contracts with Y for the
use of an automobile. If the automobile cannot run, no one would
contend that A ought to pay for the hire. The principal motive
dominating A would be presumed to be to secure an automobile
that would run, a motive that would obviously enter into the
contractual field as a tacit condition. This is clear because the
situation would change completely if the auto in question were
an immobilized museum piece and A wanted merely to exhibit
it in his showroom. Now if A contracted for the use of an auto
because he wanted to meet his best girl at the railroad station,
not knowing that she had left with a sailor at a previous stop,
no one would be likely to argue that he should not therefore pay
the hire. Nor should it make any difference if he learned of his
possible misfortune before going to the station. His principal
motive in promising to pay for the use of the auto would be to
have its use; meeting his girl at the station would be accessory
or subsidiary although obviously material. But at the same time,
if Y knew when A contracted for the auto that A was doing so
in order to meet his girl at the station and also knew that the
trip would be abortive because she had run off with a sailor, then
there would probably be agreement that A should not have to
pay Y. He would be protected by the rule that where fraud is
practiced it need only be evident that the aggrieved party would
not have contracted if he had not been so treated.
Now let us suppose that A wanted the auto to take his girl
out into the country and garrote her for her fickle heart, as Y
knew. Everyone would likely agree that such a contract would
be tainted with illegality and unenforceable. But it has been
asked: How can the cause be considered illicit in such a case?
28. See Restatement, Restitution §§ 8(2), 9(2) (1937); Restatement, Contracts § 470 (1932).

N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, 112 Vt. 402, 26 A. 2d 108

(1942) using as a test whether the error was "likely to affect the conduct of
a reasonable man with reference to the transaction in question." Courts also
inquire whether the mistake was as to a basic fact. Note, 46 Mich. L. Rev.
1045 (1948).
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This sort of question comes from the view, presented by some
writers, that cause is external, or abstract, and always the same
in any given contract-that in a contract of hire the cause of the
obligation of the one who hires is to secure the use and that there
can be nothing illicit, per se, in securing the use of an automobile.
But cause is motive and although it may be true that the immediate motive of one who hires may always be to secure use or
enjoyment, to restrict cause to immediate motive when dealing
with illegality is unnecessary and unsound. This is not done
when dealing with fraud and error. And with better reason it
should not be done when illegality is the problem. In such event
it suffices that a subsidiary, as distinguished from the principal,
cause, motive or purpose be illicit. This is entirely consistent
with the view that error with respect to a subsidiary but material
motive is sufficient if induced by fraud despite the fact that such
error does not relate to the principal cause. Fraud and also
illegality are thus more far reaching in their consequences than
simple error.
There is justification in emphasizing that the term "principal
cause" is found in the code itself.29 This is recognition of the fact
that the word "cause" comprehends more than the final or
determining motive. Simple error, in order to invalidate, must
relate to the final or determining motive, but when fraud is
involved, or illegality, no such restriction exists. In effect, when
cause is used as a means of characterizing a promise as a donation or onerous contract a similar differentiation may be necessary based on the predominating element of beneficence or
exchange. If the principal motive is to give, a donation is indicated; if exchange, an onerous contract may be found.80
Although other ramifications of the theory could be explored,
enough has been said to indicate the principal functions of cause
in the French law of conventional obligations. The discussion
also indicates that these functions are consistent with the fundamental principle that agreement without more equals contract.
There will be no contract, or legal tie, if the agreement is unlawful or contra bonos mores, which is another way of saying if the
cause is illicit; and it is subject to rescission if the cause is false.
When the French Code says that an obligation without a cause
can have no effect, it is referring to the case where the cause is
29. Art. 1110, French Civil Code. See also Art. 1823, La. Civil Code of 1870.
30. Cf. Art. 1526, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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false, and- invalidity results. An obligation is without a cause
when, because of error, fraud or violence, there is lacking a real
or true consent, or when the final and determining motive on
which consent is founded is doomed to frustration or destruction
8
because of unknown existing facts or future occurrences. '
It has been contended that the theory of cause is not at all
necessary to explain why a sale of something is without effect if
the thing has been previously destroyed, that the sale falls for
lack of an object. But at the same time, insurance has been
validly effected on things already destroyed by the occurrence
insured against. And nobody suggests lack of an object as a
reason for avoiding the insurance contract. The simple reason
for this is that the motive is not destroyed; the parties intended
to take their chances. Nor is it reasonably arguable that one
cannot "sell" a "thing," the existence of which is then in doubt.
The so-called sale of a hope is perfectly valid although the object
of the hope never materializes; the motive is clear, no mistake is
involved, the will is not vitiated.
It well may be that the civilians could separate donations
from other contracts and solve problems involving error, duress
and legality without resorting to cause. But at the same time
adequately 'dealing with error necessarily entails dealing with
motive: Nor can delving into motive be completely escaped in
endeavoring to determine in a close case the existence of a bargain-the test of common law Restatement consideration. When
Kirksey wrote Dear Sister Antillico,3 2 how can one be sure he
was not bargaining without actually dealing with his motive,
83
It
although, apparently, the common law tries to do just this?
31. "Pothier, from whom has come our Article 1131, says that an engagement contracted without cause, or of which the cause is false; is the same
thing. In effect, when an engagement has been contracted without cause,
as in the case of the sale of a house destroyed by fire before the contract, the
cause exists in the thoughts of the parties, although it has in reality ceased
to exist. They were in error: the cause was, then, false as far as they were
concerned, and in this sense one may say that a contract without a cause or
with a false cause is the same thing." 3 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 22, at 106.
See also, Bufnoir, op. cit. supra note 10, at 556; 8 Fenet, Discussions 228 (1836).

Suggestions can be found that false cause refers to a recitation of cause
that is not the true cause, but this can hardly be the kind of false cause that
results in nullity of the obligation under the rule that an obligation with a
false cause is null. If the true cause Is sufficient to sustain the obligation in
Its given form nullity will certainly not result. A donation disguised as a sale

may yet be given effect as a donation. Cf. 11 Laurent, Principes no 506 (4
ed. 1887).
32. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
33. Consider Restatement, Contracts §,84(a) and Comment (1932). Com-
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seems clear that to deal with motive, in terms of traditional
French law, despite expressions to the contrary, is to deal with
cause.
CONTRACT CHARACTERIZATION UNDER THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE

Supposedly, since the Louisiana system of contracts is that of
the French, cause should occupy the same place with us. An
examination of our Civil Code will show that in the main it does;
but there are some curious anomalies.
If the propriety of identifying cause. with motive may be
open to question under French law, no such question can arise
under the law of Louisiana. The drafters of our code specifically
provided that "by the cause of the contract ...is meant the consideration or motive for making it," and they also divided contracts "considered in relation to the motive for making them"
into gratuitous contracts and onerous contracts.3 4 The latter,
speaking broadly, were said to involve equivalents. With respect
to the former it was provided that to be gratuitous, the object
of a contract must be to benefit the person with whom it is made,
without any profit or advantage stipulated in favor of the other
party. To this was added the further explanation that a contract
"is not, however, the less gratuitous, if it proceed either from
gratitude for a benefit before received, or from the hope of
receiving one hereafter, although such benefit be of a pecuniary
nature." 35 Without going into this definition, which will bear
later examination, we seem to be consistent with the French.
Their contract of beneficence becomes our gratuitous contract,
and as with them there is no suggestion that a gratuitous contract is any the less valid than an onerous one. If we start looking for particular kinds of gratuitous contracts they are not difficult to find. As with the French, there is the mandate,8 6 the loan
for use, 37 the deposit 38 and the non-remunerative suretyship.8 9
And then, again like the French, we have donations. Disregarding the special kinds mentioned, our contracts may be said to be
pare 1 Corbin on Contracts § 118 (1950): "If something is 'bargained for' by
the promisor, it is evidently 'his conventional motive or inducement.'"
34. Arts. 1772 and 1896, La. Civil Code of 1870.
35. Art. 1773, La. Civil Code of 1870. The wording used is that of the

French version.
36. Art. 2991, La. Civil Code of 1870.
37. Art. 2894, La. Civil Code of 1870.
38. Art. 2929, La. Civil Code of 1870.

39. Art. 3035, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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divided into onerous contracts and donations. This again is consistent with the French. Donations are contracts with us as with
them-the principal type of gratuitous contract.
Whether gratuitous or onerous all contracts are prima facie
enforceable. In addition to the parties, their consent fully given,
all that is needed is a lawful purpose. 40 In consequence we may
accurately say that all promises are enforceable unless some
reason be discovered for not enforcing them. There is no additional ingredient like common law consideration. We begin,
then, with these two main divisions and with the realization that
to deal with contracts includes dealing with donations.
Although we followed the French in requiring the use of the
authentic form in the making of donations, 41 our redactors, instead of leaving to the courts the problem of distinguishing between donations and onerous contracts through the general
definitions given, became more specific. They further character42
ized donations as purely gratuitous, onerous, and remunerative.
It was then provided that whereas the purely gratuitous donation, made merely from liberality, would be subject to the formal
requirements and other rules applicable to donations, onerous
and remunerative donations were not real donations and were
not subject to the rules applicable to donations except when the
value of the thing given should exceed by one-half the value of
the charges imposed or the services rendered. 43 Onerous and
remunerative donations, subject to the exception, were thus recognized in effect as onerous contracts.
But there was a degree of inconsistency. A comparison of
these provisions with the definitions of gratuitous and onerous
contracts 44 demonstrates that whereas a donation subject to a
charge falls within the definition of an onerous contract, yet a
donation made to recompense for services rendered, although
clearly comprehended by the definition of gratuitous contracts in
Article 1773, is, by virtue of Article 1526, also treated as an onerous contract unless the value of the thing given is considerably
greater than that of the services-or more specifically, unless it
exceeds the latter by one-half. A contract gratuitous by defini40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Art. 1779, La. Civil Code
Art. 1536, La. Civil Code
Art. 1523, La. Civil Code
Art. 1526, La. Civil Code
Arts. 1773, 1774, La. Civil

of 1870.
of 1870.
of 1870.
of 1870.
Code of 1870.
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tion becomes onerous by its exclusion from the field of donations.
Without relying on Article 1526, the only way that we could
hold with any show of justification that a promise made in recognition of beneficial and gratuitous services received is enforceable as an onerous contract would be to construe the words "proceed . . . from gratitude" in Article 1773 as not including such
a promise. This would be to say that such a promise does not
proceed from gratitude but rather from a sense of duty or obligation. But even if we got over that hurdle in such dubious fashion
we would run headlong into the fact that the receipt of beneficial
services does not raise a natural obligation in view of the exclusive categories established by Article 175845 but leaves only a
moral or imperfect obligation.
This leads to a comparison of other provisions of our code.
Article 175746 sets up three kinds of obligations: imperfect, natural, and civil or perfect. Our chief concern is with the first two.
They divide obligations into purely moral duties, such as the
duty of exercising gratitude or charity, and a special kind of duty
that is said to be binding in conscience and according to natural
justice, a natural obligation. Neither of these obligations is
enforceable. However, the purpose of the division is made apparent by the two following articles, although in a negative sort of
way. Article 1758 recognizes four kinds of natural obligations,
and Article 175947 provides that no suit will lie to recover what
has been paid, or given in compliance with a natural obligation
and further, that a natural obligation is sufficient "consideration"
for a new contract. The basic purpose of these provisions begins
to emerge. A promise based on a natural obligation is said to
constitute a new contract although the code does not say what
kind. A necessary inference, however, is that the draftsmen
meant an onerous contract because a promise based on an imperfect or moral obligation would clearly amount to a gratuitous
contract as defined in Article 1773. To find therefore that an
obligation is based on a natural obligation is to find that it is not
a donation. At the same time if based on a merely moral obligation and a depletion of patrimony is involved it becomes a donation and its character as purely gratuitous, onerous, or remuner45. Art. 1758, La. Civil Code of 1870.
REivmw 79 (1951).
46. Art. 1757, La. Civil Code of 1870.

47. Art. 1759, La. Civil Code of 1870.

See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

XII

ative has to be determined. 48 The concept of natural obligations
thus serves as a means for classifying or characterizing the resulting contract.
As has already been seen, the French, without a restricting
article like our 1526, have expanded the concept of natural obligations to include any imperious duty of conscience. 49 Having a
transfer made to recompense for service rendered they first determine whether the services lend themselves to an evaluation in
money and, having decided this in the affirmative, if they further
find a reasonable correspondence between the value of the thing
given and the value of the services, their conclusion is that the
giver was being moved not by merely a spirit of liberality but
by a sense of obligation measurable in money-instead of gratitude-and so conclude that the transfer does not constitute a
donation and does not have to be in authentic form. The cause
of such a contract is not a will to give but a sense of indebtedness or obligation resting upon the promisor. When he promises,
he is promising to pay, not to give. If the services are the kind
of services upon which a money value cannot be placed, then
the transfer must rest upon a sense of gratitude alone, which is
the kind of obligation that gives rise to a donation and not to an
onerous contract.5"
As a consequence of our Article 1526 we come out at somewhat the same place. In effect, this article is a legislative finding
that the cause of a transfer made to recompense for services
received, if they can be appreciated in money, 51 lies in a duty of
conscience instead of a spirit of liberality except when the value
of the object is so considerably greater than the services rendered that the intention to confer a benefit by way of liberality
is apparent. The legislature has, in effect, weighed the value of
the thing given against the value of the services and made a
determination of the question of whether a sense of duty or a
spirit of liberality was the predominant motive. It thus has done
for our courts what the French courts do for themselves. And
by Article 1526, an imperfect obligation that "has no legal opera48. Art. 1526, La. Civil Code of 1870.
49. Supra, p. 8.
50. The terms "moral" or "natural" obligation may be used by the
French and they have been liberal in applying the concept so as to find
that the authentic form is not necessary. See Planol, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 157.

51. Art. 1525, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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tion" becomes an effective natural obligation giving rise to an
onerous contract.
Another observation might be justified. Our supreme court
has held, and this seems to be in accord with the intention of the
redactors, that the kinds of natural obligations recognized in
Article 1758 are exclusive. 52 At the same time nobody has ever
questioned the legal efficacy of a simple written promise to pay
the debt of a third person.53 Indeed, the court has also recognized
.that a son may bind himself by promising to pay his deceased
father's prescribed debt. 54 Actually, promises of this kind are

not intended as donations and the authentic form should not be
required but yet such a result is difficult to square with the definitions of natural obligations and onerous and gratuitous contracts. One may wonder whether the redactors had all of this
in mind. 5
Although generalization is here fraught with danger, one
thing does seem to stand out clearly: the purpose of the drafters
was to stick with our own principles; they had no intention of
importing into our law common law principles foreign to it. It is
unimportant whether natural affection might have been recognized as "good consideration" for a conveyance at common law. 56
They thought it was and, believing that such a principle would
be contrary to our law, they sought to exclude the possibility by
narrowly defining the types of natural obligations. But then,
when they provided that a natural obligation is a sufficient consideration for a new contract they were not using the language
of the Code Napoleon. Theirs was the customary language of
52. Succession of Miller v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 110 La. 652, 34 So.
723 (1903).
53. See Art. 2278, La. Civil Code of 1870; Flood v. Thomas, 5 Mart. (N.S.)
560 (La. 1827).
54. Matthews v. Williams, 25 La. Ann. 585 (1873).
55. 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, 226
(1937), explaining Articles 1758 and 1759: "Although this kind of obligation
[the imperfect] has no legal effect whatever, its definition is introduced
because it is frequently referred to by commentators and sometime with such
loose expressions, as might induce a belief that it had the effect of a natural
obligation, unless the contrary were declared. In the common law of England,
'natural affection' which is an imperfect obligation, is a good consideration
for a conveyance. As we do not mean to sanction this principle, it was the
more necessary to declare it, because of the danger of introducing from the
jurisprudence of our sister states principles inconsistent with that of our
own." See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 79 (1951).
56. For an explanation of this see Sharington v. Strotton, 1 Plowd. 298,
75 Eng. Rep. 454 (K.B. 1565); Pound, Individual Interests of SubstancePromised Advantages, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1945).
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the common law. In their favor is the fact that they used the
word "cause" instead of consideration 57 but the provision does
not come off much the better even with the substitution:58 What
they might have said instead is that a promise supported by a
natural obligation gives rise to an onerous contract. The American Law Institute may now have told us that we may not speak
of "natural obligation" as being "consideration" because consideration is only that which is bargained for. Once the bargain
theory be imposed, the statement is perfectly true, since when
one makes a promise in response to a natural obligation he surely
is not bargaining. But despite this sound logic, the common law
courts have for many a long year called a natural obligation sufficient consideration, and to anyone familiar with that learning,
what the Louisiana Civil Code says seems to be eminently in
accord as the accepted language of the common law. To sum
this up, promises supported by natural obligations create onerous
contracts since they do not arise from the will to confer a gratuity
by way of liberality. Promises supported by moral obligations
presumably give rise to gratuitous contracts, but if they are made
to remunerate for past services, and there is the required correspondence in value, they will be treated as onerous contracts
rather than donations. The French, on the contrary, have only
the basic element to deal with in such cases, that is, cause.
The treatment of this problem in our code carries the suggestion that the redactors had a better knowledge of common
law consideration than they did of cause. But this is not believed
to be true. Perhaps a better conclusion would be that they
believed common law consideration was more closely related to
cause than we think of its being today. The Projet of the Louisiana Civil Code was submitted by the redactors in the year 1823.
It should not be surprising if their understanding of the doctrine
of consideration was not comparable to that of a present day
scholar of Anglo-American contract law. The source material
available to them was doubtless very scanty. When one notices
to what extent reliance was placed by the American Law Institute on the writings and opinions of Justice Holmes in resolving
57. See French version of Art. 1759 in

3 Louisiana

Legal Archives, Com-

piled Editon of the Civil Codes (1942).
58. An objection to judicial processing on the basis of natural obligations
is that this tends to shift the focus away from the basic problem, i.e.,
whether the court is dealing with a donation, and to give undesirable emphasis to the idea that the natural obligation furnishes a required legal support
without which the promise would not be binding.
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the meaning of consideration, it is not at all surprising that the
drafters of our code, who wrote long before his time, did not
have the same idea about it that modern scholars have. There
is, too, no lack of evidence that in its English beginnings the word
"consideration" was used in a non-technical sense to denote the
act or other circumstance leading up to or constituting the
"motive" or "cause" for a given transaction.5 9 It seems certain
that when our redactors spoke of cause and consideration in the
same breath, they were thinking that consideration was the same
as cause, not the other way around. Enough support for this lies
in their definition of cause and consideration as the motive for a
contract.60 A justifiable, if not necessary, deduction should be
that when the word consideration is encountered in the Code it
should not be taken to mean common law bargain consideration
61
but motive or cause.
59. Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, 1949 Reprint 13; 8
Holdsworth, History of the English Law 7.
60. Art. 1896, La. Civil Code of 1870.
61. A brief survey of some related provisions of the Civil Code will be
enlightening. In the first place, as we all know, whenever there is any conflict between the French and English versions of the code, the French is
controlling. Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886). Likewise, if we would
know the meaning of a word used in the French version we must determine
the French meaning. Referring particularly to the word "consideration,"
sometimes used in the French version but not as a word of art, the French
meaning is "motive," "reason," "grounds." See Heath's New French Dictionary (1932). The translation from the French to the English strongly suggests
that the translator was more familiar with common law "consideration"
than he was with French cause.
In Article 1759 "consideration" is substituted for "cause." In Article 1773
"stipulated in favor of the other party" becomes "received or promised as a
consideration for it." In Article 1774 "as a consideration for" is substituted
for "in consideration of." Notice here how the French use is consistent with
"motive," "reason" or "grounds," whereas the rendition in English suggests
something given in return for. In Article 1825 the French "this principal
cause is that without which" is distorted into "this principal cause is called
the motive and means that consideration." In Article 1875 the French "sufficient price" is rendered "proper consideration" and in Article 1890 "or price"
becomes "or consideration." In 1896 "when the consideration that has induced
its making" is converted into "when the consideration for making it" and
the same thing is again done in 1897. Notice again how much more consonant
the original language is with the French meaning of "consideration." In
Article 1898 there is no French counterpart at all for the words "the consideration." In Article 1900 "in the consideration" is substituted for "in the
contract," and "a true and sufficient consideration" is substituted for "another
true and sufficient cause." There is no counterpart for "or consideration" in
the French version of Articles 1981 and 1982, and in the latter "if the only
price paid" is twisted into "if the only consideration."
Many are the cases in which the courts talk in terms of common law
consideration, and of course consideration is part of the practitioner's language as well. With so much help in the code itself, surely this is not
strange. In addition, Louisiana is surrounded by common law jurisdictions
and flooded with common law reports, texts and legal writings. Louisiana's
schools have been teaching common law contract law and, it may be, not
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A critical examination of the jurisprudence would unduly
extend the length of this discussion, but reference to a few problem cases may be justified. Pertinent here is the case of Barthe v.
Succession of Lacroix.2 The litigation involved an attempt by
plaintiff to recover the amount of a promissory note for $500.00
given to plaintiff by his deceased former employer. The defense
was no consideration and an absence of the necessary formalities
to constitute a donation. In holding for the plaintiff the court
said: " ... the conclusior we have reached is that the deceased,
Lacroix, being without family, and believing that plaintiff had
served him long and faithfully at very small wages, felt that he
was under a moral obligation to remunerate him beyond his
wages, and executed this $500.00 note for that purpose. In one
sense it was a gratuity; i.e., he was under no legal obligation to
do so. In another sense it was the fulfillment of a natural obligation. We think that there was a good and valid consideration
for the note. Under this view it becomes unnecessary to pass
upon the questions raised as to the validity of donations disguised under the form of onerous contracts." From the standpoint of the civilian this method of handling the case is good
except for the reference to valid consideration. The court seems
to have found something more to support the promise than a
mere spirit of liberality. Its discovery of a "natural obligation"
is in keeping with a customary way of disposing of such questions by the French courts.
But the difficulty with the court's disposition of the case is
that the natural obligation found by it is not comprehended by
Article 1758 and the promise also falls clearly within the definition of a gratuitous contract in Article 1773 and seems to be
supported by only an imperfect obligation as defined in Article
1756. Furthermore, it falls also within the definition of a remunerative donation in Articles 1523 and 1525. In view of these
provisions, plus Article 1526, the true and ultimate question
before the court was whether the value of the note exceeded by
one-half the value of the services. If it did not, the note was
enforceable. as an onerous contract; if it did, the note could not
be enforced because it was not in authentic form.6 8 Consequently,
succeeding too well in emphasizing the differences between cause and consideration. We have probably learned our consideration better than our cause
with the result that our cause has come to be, to a distressing extent, common law consideration. This, it is not believed, the drafters ever intended.
62. 29 La. Ann. 326 (1877).
63. Cf. Heirs of Cole v. Cole's Executors, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 414 (La. 1829).
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although the result reached by the court may have been correct
the reason in support thereof can hardly be approved.
From another aspect, this case is of further interest. The
accepted view of the French that a "promise" or "right" may be
the subject of a donation has already been discussed. 4 There
has been no definitive holding in Louisiana that the word "act"
in Article 1468 should be interpreted as "contract" nor that the
words "the thing given" include also an intangible "right" or
promise. That is, the Louisiana courts have not yet clearly held
that one may donate his own promise. Counsel for defendant in
this case seem to have conceded that a promise might be the
subject of a gift by arguing that the note in question was unenforceable because it was not in the form required for donations. Nor did the court suggest that one could not donate his
own promise. Of course, it may be said that this question was
pretermitted by the holding that there was "good and valid consideration" for the note. But the fact that the court seemed to
recognize that a donation might be made in the form of a note
by authentic act is worth remembering.
At common law, the possibility of making a gift of one's own
promise is not yet recognized.
The common law insists on
having some "object" that is delivered in consummation of the
gift. This has been stretched to include, by way of example, a
promissory note of some third person on the basis of the reasoning that a symbolical delivery of the "thing" given is made
through the medium of the delivery of the evidence of the debt.
This conclusion is supported by the realization that the donor,
under such circumstances, makes the only kind of delivery he
can make. But when it comes to a donor's attempt to give his
own note, then the common law becomes concerned about 6onsideration. This is because one cannot create a duty in himself
in such fashion without -consideration. The civil law, on the
other hand, recognizes that a person can create a duty in himself
by promising to do something, and he does not have to get anything in return for it. And it is only when he makes his promise
out of a pure spirit of liberality that he must put it in authentic
form to enable the other party to enforce it in the courts. Since
"consideration" is not a requirement with us, there is no reason
we should not recognize that a person may make a donation of
64. Supra, pp. 4 et seq.
65. See Corbin on Contracts § 114 (1950).
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his own promise just as he can donate another's promise to him
if we do not permit the wording of Article 1468 to mislead us.
Even if our courts have not definitely so held, what the French
are doing, as well as the reason of the matter, should be sufficiently persuasive. And besides this the common law gives full
recognition to the binding efficacy of a promise under seal, without being concerned with consideration, which has close analogy
to the civilian promise of a gift by way of authentic act.
The possibility of a person's making a donation of his own
note was recognized, furthermore, by Judge Porter, in the early
case of Heirs of Cole v. Cole's Executors.66 In rejecting an effort
to-recover on a promissory note for $3,000.00 against the executors of a succession, the court said: "It has been contended this
was a remuneratory donation, not subject to the rules which
apply to donations strictly such. Admitting the law to be as
stated, the donee should prove the value of the services.... The
note can be considered in no other light than an attempt to disguise under the form of an onerous contract a liberality to the
plaintiff, and is null for want of the formalities prescribed by
law for donations inter vivos." The significant thing is that the
court plainly recognized, and with good reason, that the note
would be null simply for want of the formalities prescribed by
law for donations.
Our courts have long recognized the rule that a sale of
immovable property, where the price is not paid or intended to
be paid, may yet be sustained as a donation, provided that the
instrument is executed before a notary and two witnesses."' This
is merely a recognition of the fact that such a transferor is
moved, not by a desire, to secure an advantage for himself, since
he does not exact a price for his property, but solely by a desire
to confer a benefit upon the transferee by way of gratuity. This,
in turn, constitutes a finding that the cause of the transaction is
the animus donandi and, this being so, the transaction is a donation. This principle, indeed, is explicitly recognized in Article
2464 of the code which provides that the price "ought not to be
out of all proportion with the value of the thing; for instance
66. 7 Mart. (N.S.) 414 (La. 1829). But see Succession of Rabasse, 49 La.
Ann. 1405, 22 So. 767 (1897) where the court, about 70 years later, declined to
express an opinion on the point.
67. D'Orgenoy v. Droz, 13 La. 382 (1839); McWilliams v. McWilliams, 39
La. Ann. 924, 3 So. 62 (1887); Reinerth v. Rhody, 52 La. Ann. 2029, 28 So.
277 (1900).
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the sale of a plantation for a dollar could not be considered as a
fair sale; it 'would be considered a donation disguised." Obviously enough, as a donation the transfer would be subject to all
of the qualifications applicable to donations but they are of no
interest in 'the present discussion. A holding of this kind is not
normally stated in terms of cause, but this is probably because
it is too obvious that a person intends to donate if he transfers
8
his property to another without seeking anything in return.
Our charitable subscription cases are also intriguing. In the
leading case of Louisiana College v. Keller6 9 the court concluded,
in holding for the college: "An obligation, according to the Code
is not the less binding, though its consideration or cause is not
expressed. We are not informed as to the consideration of this
promise, by anything on the face of the papers. It may have
been the advantage the defendant expected to derive from the
establishment of a college at his own door, by which he would
save great expense in the education of his children, or it may
have been a spirit of liberality and a desire to be distinguished
as the patron of letters. Whatever it may have been, we see
nothing illicit in it; nothing forbidden by law, and the promise
binds him, if he consented freely, and the contract had a lawful
object. In contracts of beneficence, the intention to confer a
70
benefit is a sufficient consideration."
The conclusion that the subscriber must pay is certainly
acceptable. But the method the court employed in reaching it is
another thing. The court seemed to think that it had to find
consideration and it found it in the intention to confer a benefit.
But an intention to confer a benefit, as the cause of a promise,
makes the promise a donation. And, if a donation, it must be in
authentic form to be enforceable. Yet this seemingly did not
occur to the court. Also Article 1765 says that the duty of exercising charity is an imperfect obligation that has no legal operation. The sequel is that if this was an exercise of charity then
the resulting contract would have to be gratuitous, and not onerous. This was apparently the court's conclusion because it
referred to the contract as one of beneficence. But yet the court
did not seem to feel that a pure liberality was intended. It spoke
68.
ment a
69.
70.

For an interesting comparison see Restatement, Contracts § 84, Com(1932).
10 La. 164 (1836).
Id. at 167.

.LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XII

of the advantage of having a college nearby and of the money
to be saved by the subscriber in educating his children. With
the proper emphasis on this sort of thing it could easily have
gone on to the conclusion that in making the subscription the
subscriber was not actuated by a pure spirit of liberality but
offered his subscription for the purpose of attaining the end he
was seeking, namely, the establishment of the college in his community, and so have held that it was not dealing with a donation
and that the promise was enforceable although it was not in
authentic form.7 1 This would have put it in line with the French
and would not have resulted in the anomaly of a contract of
beneficence supported by consideration found in the intention to
confer a benefit and enforceable because it was so supported.
Actually the court's reasoning ended completely in the air because, having found that this was a contract of beneficence resulting from an intention to confer a benefit, it did not explain why
the use of the authentic form was not required. Nevertheless,
cases such as this reflect basic acceptance of the doctrine of
cause, although the use of consideration may have produced a
partial eclipse.
The Louisiana cases involving the release, in whole or in
part, of obligations, present a curious admixture of civil and
common law theories.
The release of the whole of a debt has occasioned no serious
difficulty. Such a release constitutes a voluntary remission of
the debt, the effectiveness of which is adequately provided for
by the articles of the Code. A voluntary remission is recognized
as constituting a liberality extended by the creditor to his debtor
that might well be subjected to the form required for donations
except that the law is otherwise, at least with respect to remission inter vivos.7 2 If a creditor sees fit to release his debtor, his

freedom to do so is embraced in the freedom he enjoys to affect
his legal relations by manifesting a will to do so. The remission
is his voluntary act and it should follow that he has like power
to remit a portion of the debt due if he does not wish to remit
the whole.
71. Of course Articles 1756 and 1773 would complicate such an approach.
72. See Arts. 2199-2201, La. Civil Code of 1870; Hicks v. Hicks, 145 La.
465, 82 So. 415 (1919). Cf. Succession of Matthews, 158 So. 233 (La. App. 1935),
noted in 9 Tulane L. Rev. 615 (1936); Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 334, no 353 et seq.; 7 Planiol et Ripert, Droit Civil Franeals 635 (1930).
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Difficulty arises, however, when a debtor tenders- to his
creditor a portion of the debt in satisfaction of the whole. There
has been much talk in the cases about liquidated and unliquidated
claims, and common law principles applicable thereto, justified
by supposed differences in legal result depending on the character
of the claim.73 Common law authorities have been relied on to
justify application of a rule that where the amount involved is
unliquidated or disputed and the creditor accepts a part payment
in full satisfaction, the entire debt is discharged.7 4 Such an
approach is hardly consistent with civilian theory.
Since a creditor may voluntarily remit a portion of a debt,
the only question in any case, whether the debt is liquidated or
unliquidated, is, has he done so? Surely, having a liquidated debt,
if the debtor sends part payment accompanied by an expression
of hope that the creditor will accept it in full, and the creditor
replies saying that he will gladly do so, it would not likely be
argued that a remission of the remainder had not taken place.
If, again, the debtor sends such a payment bearing the simple
notation that it is tendered in full of the entire claim, acceptance
of the payment will likewise constitute a remission of the remainder. That is, a tacit consent to remit can be found. Now, if the
creditor receiving, say, a check with such a notation, strikes out
the notation and nevertheless cashes the check there will definitely be absent an actual consent to remit. The only question
remaining will be whether or not, despite the creditor's action
in negativing an intention to remit, he should be held, as a matter
of law, to have remitted the remainder. This will depend simply
on whether he would or should be held estopped to accept the
payment and reject the condition on which it is offered. This is,
of course, precisely the question the courts come to when the
debt is unliquidated, and they hold, supposedly following the
common law, that the creditor is estopped, that he will not be
heard to say he was not also accepting the condition. This means,
of course, that the consent to release is thereby supplied. The
ultimate question when the debt is liquidated (as well as when
unliquidated) is whether a creditor should be privileged to accept
73. Berger v. Quintero, 170 La. 38, 127 So. 356 (1930); Sentell v. Wilcox,
3 Or. App. 503 (La. 1906); Meyers v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 138 So. 443
(La. App. 1931).
74. Berger v. Quintero, 170 La. 38, 127 So. 356 (1930); Sentell v. Wilcox,
3 Orl. App. 503 (La. 1906); Meyers v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 138 So. 443
(La. App. 1931). Cf. Mayer v. Mayer, 131 So. 696 (La. App. 1931); Conner v.
Harper, 197 La. 677, 2 So. 2d 177 (1941).
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part payment and reject the condition that it be accepted in full
satisfaction. The reason why a common law court says that a
condition of acceptance in full satisfaction is not binding on the
creditor who accepts the payment when the debt is liquidated is
that there is no consideration to support the creditor's release
of the unpaid remainder. But our courts must find some other
reason for holding the creditor not bound since he has the power
to make a gratuitous remission. This should not be too difficult.
Pothier has suggested that when the debtor obliges the creditor to make a promise in return for the performance by the for7
mer of his existing legal duty, the promise has an illicit cause. 1
*This is based on the theory that it is an exaction on the debtor's
part to require of his creditor anything for doing what the law
obliges him to do. If it be reasoned that a tender of part payment on condition that a full remittance be given constitutes an
exaction, then the rule might apply, but it is believed that this
would be an unwarranted extension of Pothier's theory, short
of finding a degree of duress that deprives the creditor of his
free will. But there is another approach that perhaps has more
merit. That is, the code is specific that obligations must be
performed in good faith.7 6 Fairly applied this can mean that
good faith requires a debtor to pay the whole of a debt that is
due and payable and not to undertake to trap or coerce his
creditor into releasing the remainder of the debt by taking a
portion sent to him with a condition attached to the effect that
if he does he will thereby remit the whole. It is certainly arguable that if the creditor does not wish to insist on payment of
the whole at the time he might yet accept the part payment, as
such, without being held estopped to claim the remainder. An
application of the theory of estoppel would be in effect to condone the debtor's breach of good faith in not performing his
obligation by tendering payment in full. Hence, whereas the
common law might say when dealing with a creditor's acceptance
of part payment of a liquidated debt, tendered in full settlement,
that the creditor is not bound by the condition because, granting
that he accepts the condition in accepting the payment yet there
is no consideration to support his release of the remainder, we
could simply say that the creditor is not estopped to insist that
he negatived the intention to remit by striking out the condition
75. 1 Pothier, Obligations 126, no 46 (Evans, 1853).
76. Art. 1901, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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because the condition was not lawfully imposed since the debtor
was guilty of violating his own obligation to perform in good
faith.
The theory here dealt with is applicable to all cases where
an obligation is assumed in return for the performance by another
of a pre-existing legal duty. The obligation, where voluntarily
assumed, would be binding; its normal effect would be destroyed
only where it was exacted under circumstances that would support the conclusion that the promisor did not actually have a
living choice.
Practically speaking this rule puts the civil law just about
where the decided cases in Anglo-American jurisdictions put the
common law. A study of the common law cases will make apparent that the issue of enforceability turns largely on the good or
bad faith of the promisee, whether the promise be by the other
contracting party or by a third party. Common law courts
accomplish this end by employing dubiously such concepts as
waiver, voluntary rescission, new contract. 77 The civil law,
guided' by the will of the party, can call a spade a spade.
CAUSE AND ERROR UNDER THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE

The provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code concerning the
meaning and effect of error, fraud, violence and threats, indicate faithful adherence to the French method of resolving problems involving these characteristics through application of the
concept of cause. The code specifically recognizes that when
reference is made to an obligation "without a cause" what is
meant is an obligation "with a false cause. ' T8 The expression is
an unhappy one, particularly for anyone schooled in common law
consideration, because it suggests that cause is something received
for an obligation, instead of the reason, or purpose, or motive
itself. Error is spoken of in the civil law as a vice of consent
because consent given on the basis of error is not a true consent
if it would not have been given except for such error. Our code
is very clear that when simple error alone is involved it must
relate to the principal cause, not a secondary or subsidiary cause
77. See Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 298, 20 Am. Dec. 475 (Mass. 1830);
Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1890);"
Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67 Atl. 286 (1907); Schwartzreich v. BaumanBasch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
78. Art. 1896, La. Civil Code of 1870.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XII

or motive.79 But it also shows that when fraud is involved, the
error does not have to relate to the principal cause but need be
only on a material part of the contract. 80 Violence has in effect
the same scope because it is destructive of consent."'
Reasoning similar to the foregoing is applicable also to the
case where there is a failure of performance by one of the parties
to a bilateral contract. Since the motive of each party is to
secure that which he is promised in return, it follows that he
would not give his own promise if he should know that the
return performance would not be rendered. Consequently, if this
happens the consent of the aggrieved party has derived from
error and its effectiveness is destroyed.8 2 This principle supports
the oft-repeated but poorly stated rule that a contract subject to
a potestative condition is unenforceable. The code provides that
an obligation subject to a potestative condition on the part of him
who binds himself is null.8 3 Actually a so-called obligation subject
84
to a purely potestative condition is not an obligation at all. Just
as a promise of this character at common law is called an illusory
promise, we may call such an obligation an illusory obligation.
Indeed, this term was used to describe an obligation subject to a
potestative condition when the French projet of the Code Civil
was being presented to the Conseil d'Etat.85 It is in fact no obligation because the language used does not state an obligation;
because it does not commit the user to any future course of conduct.8 6 But at the moment, this is not the important point. What
we are concerned with is the effect such an illusory obligation has
on the obligation of the other party in a bilateral and commutative
contract. The answer is, of course, that he is not bound. Thinking tends to stop with the thought that if one party is not bound
79. Art. 1823, La. Civil Code of 1870.

80. Art. 1847(2), La. Civil Code of 1870.
81. Art. 1859, La. Civil Code of 1870.
82. It is often said that the theory of cause is not needed to explain the
equivalence between promises in a bilateral contract; yet the very nature of
the contract itself is determined by the will or motive of the parties.
83. Art. 2034, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Note, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
100 (1951).

84. The significance of the word "purely" lies in the fact that although
the duty to perform an obligation may rest in a choice to be made by the
obligor, nullity will not result if the obligor's freedom is limited in a substantial way. If the choice is between, say, raising his hand or not raising it,
such a condition, not involving a substantial limitation of freedom, is said to
be purely potestative.
85. 8 Fenet, Discussions 423 (1836).
86. Id. at 240. "8i la condition depend de 'une des parties contractantes,
qut est la maltresse de rompe ou de maintenir le lien que l'acte semble former,
il n'y a point re1llement d'obligation; elle est nulle."
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the other should not be bound. But a further examination of this
may be helpful.
Emphasis has already been given to the point that a man
may bind himself without receiving anything in return simply
by manifesting a will to be bound. At the same time, if a party
binds himself in order to get something in return then it should
follow that if he does not get it he should be released. Hence,
basically, when the supposed obligation of one of the parties to
a bilateral contract in fact leaves him free to perform or not
perform, the other party, although seeking a return obligation,
does not get one. Whereas he believes that he is getting something of value, a conclusion justified by the fact that he has
entered into a contract characterized by an exchange of equivalents, it turns out that he is not. Consequently, that which induces
him to give his promise is a false belief, that the return obligation will be equally efficacious to assure his receiving the return
performance. Since it is not, his motive is founded in error and
the cause of his undertaking is false.
This is sufficient to explain also the view that when an
obligation subject to a potestative condition has been fulfilled,
the other party is no longer free to demand his release.8 7 This is
but saying that when that which induces the promisor to give his
promise has been received by him, the fact that the other party
was not obligated to furnish it ceases to be of consequence.
Although error may have been present initially the promisor's
purpose or motive has nevertheless been realized and he has no
cause for complaint. This is, of course, true only as to performance rendered, and as long as the promisor must depend solely
upon the will of the other party without recourse he is entitled
to be discharged from his own undertaking that he intended to
assume only for an equivalent one. If it be said that all of this
merely flows from the fact that the promises in a bilateral contract are mutually dependent, it may be remembered that this is
so only because the parties intend them to be, that the motive of
each is to secure the obligation of the other, and this brings us
back to cause.
THE

WILL AND REVOCABILITY OF OFFERS

The theory of cause is also implicit in the problem of revocability of offers to contract. According to the corhmon law an
87. See Owens v. Muslow, 166 La. 423, 117 So. 449 (1928).
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offer is revocable unless it is supported by consideration. The
view that an offeror should not lose his legal freedom to revoke
his offer before acceptance unless he has asked for and received
something in return for the offer itself is, of course, consistent
with the common law's insistence on a consideration to support
a contract. But since French civilian law gives recognition to the
binding efficacy of a manifestation of will although nothing
may be asked in return, it should follow that an offeror may bind
himself not to revoke his offer for a period of time merely by
manifesting a will to do so. And it does.
The Louisiana Civil Code, adhering closely to its civilian
source, expressly provides that although the contract proposed
in an offer does not come into existence until the acceptance of
the one to whom it is made yet the party making the offer may
not withdraw it without allowing such reasonable time as from
the terms of the offer he has given or from the circumstances
of the case he may be supposed to have intended to give to the
8
acceptor to communicate his determination.1
The Louisiana cases manifest a definite reluctance to apply
this clear provision of the code.8 9 This is probably due to the
influence of the doctrine of common law consideration. It might
be believed that it is also due to a judicial reluctance to hold
an offeror bound despite a revocation before acceptance when he
has not received anything to compensate him for his surrender
of legal freedom. But there is no good reason to believe that the
courts have been so moved, despite the clear language of the
code, and so the easy conclusion seems to be that a real doubt
concerning the meaning of the code, and rooted in the doctrine
of consideration, has not been dissipated.
Some justification for the existence of doubt can be found
in a legislative amendment to Article 2462 so as to add thereto
a provision providing for the "purchase" of an option to accept
an offer or promise to sell for any "consideration" therein stipu88. Art. 1809, La. Civil Code of 1870. Since this is a limitation on the
power of revocation Imposed by the offeror himself the code further provides
for the termination of an unaccepted offer by the death of the offeror. Art.
1810, La. Civil Code of 1870.
89. Consider Boyd v. Cox, 15 La. Ann. 609 (1860); Miller v. Douville, 45
La. Ann. 214, 12 So. 132 (1893); Blanks v. Sutcliffe, 122 La. 448, 47 So. 765
(1908); Albert v. Farnsworth & Co., Inc., 176 F. 2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949); Miller
v. Oden, 149 La. 771, 90 So. 167 (1921).
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lated and adding that in such event the "offer or promise cannot
be withdrawn before the time agreed upon." 90
It seems hardly necessary to say that such an amendment
was unsoundly conceived. It must have sprung from a belief that
an offer to sell containing a stated time for acceptance was
revocable at any time before acceptance. Yet Article 1809 is
flatly contradictory of such a proposition. Nevertheless, our
supreme court solemnly declared that before the amendment to
Article 2462 there was an hiatus in our law and then went
further to add that common law precedents must govern since,
theretofore, options were unknown to our law.9 1
If an option is a power of acceptance for a period of time
that is paid for by the offeree it may be accepted without cavil
that the code originally contained no mention of options. But
it is only a fair question to ask why it should have. It did specifically provide that an offeror is not free to revoke his offer
within the time allowed by him to the offeree for his acceptance.
And beyond this, under the broad recognition given by the code
to the principle of freedom of contract there is no reason to
believe that if an offeree paid an offeror for conferring upon
him the power to accept an offer to sell within a stipulated time
the latter would not be contractually bound. Surely if "all things
that are not forbidden by law" may legally become the subject
of contracts we do not need the common law to tell us the legal
effect of an offer bought and paid for by an offeree-surely not if
contracts have the force of law on those who make them.
As a way out of this it could be believed, at first blush, that
perhaps the purpose of the amendment was merely to provide
for an offer that would survive the death of the offeror since
generally offers terminate at such time.92 But plausible as this
may be, the answer is that contract obligations generally do not
terminate with the death of the obligor and the grant of a power
of acceptance for a period of time made in return for a payment
received is characterized by a concurrence of the wills of both
parties and therefore has the status of contract.
90. Art. 2462, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Acts 249 of 1910,
3 of 1910 (2 E.S.) and 27 of 1920.
91. Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 127 So. 624 (1930); Glover v. Abney,
160 La. 175, 106 So. 735 (1926).

92. Succession of Witting, 121 La. 501, 46 So. 606 (1908);
Marston, 185 La. 365, 169 So. 436 (1936).
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The substance of this is that the amendment simply constitutes another unnecessary surrender to the common law doctrine
of consideration that might be considered as a tacit legislative
recognition that offers unsupported by "consideration" may be
withdrawn before acceptance. Yet one may well raise, an eyebrow over Louisiana's curious conduct in doing an about face to
follow the common law when the advanced thinkers at common
law are eyeing the French recognition of the binding efficacy of
an offeror's expression of will with unabashed admiration.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The French Commission to revise the Code Civil has had a
lively time dealing with cause and its relationship to liberalities
and to problems involving error. 93 Differences of opinion have
been marked. The principal controversy has been over whether
to accept cause as an abstract concept, to be carefully distinguished from motive, or to recognize it as the determining
motive.9 4 The discussions make it plain that the primary objection to treating cause as an abstract equivalent, always the same
for any given contract, lies in the fact that the result would be
that liberalities have no cause. At the same time it was argued
that if cause be identified with the determining motive its effect
in cases involving error would be too broad. Discussions of this
kind have resulted in the adoption by the Commission, despite
the holding of a contrary opinion by its President, de la Morandiere, of articles treating separately of cause and motive and
providing that error as to the cause entails the nullity of the
juridical act but that error as to the motive has no effect on its
validity.95 But at the same time the commissioners seemed to
agree that the cause of a liberality resides in the intention to
confer a benefit by way of gratuity. 96
With due deference to the decision reached by the majority
of the commission, the difficulties they voiced are believed to
93. For discussions of the work of the Commission see Verrier, Les
Travaux de la Commission de Refonte du Code Civil Francais, 28 Can. B. Rev.
247 (1950); Ancel, The Revision of the French Civil Code, 25 Tulane L. Rev.
435 (1951).
94. Travaux de la Commission de R4forme du Code Civil 266-276 (19471948).
95. Id. at 275. "M. le President.-Tout en dtant personnellment opposd
rlZa division en deux paragraphestraitant de la cause et des motifs, je crois
que ces deux articles sous cette presentation traduisent l'opinion dominante.
Ils sont adopt68."

96. Id. at 270, 271.
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result directly from undertaking to make a distinction that does
not exist, that is, between cause and motive, coupled with a
failure to distinguish properly between the final determining
motive and subsidiary motivesY7 This resulted in the adoption of
the rule that error as to the motive does not affect the validity of
a juridical act. 98 This difference is sometimes referred to as the
difference between the cause of the obligation or cause "abstraite"
and the cause of the contract or the motive. Even M. 'de la
Morandiere himself had to ask a colleague "Qu'entendez-vous par
99
'cause abstraite'?"
And the answer by M. Niboyet was, "Elle
est la meme, toujours, dans le meme type d'operationsjuridiques.
Dans un contrat synallagmatique, la cause de l'obligation d'un
contractaut est l'execution de l'obligation de l'autre contractant.
Voyez ce que disait Capitant: dans la vente, s'il n'y a pas deux
obligations que se font equilibre, iln'y a pas de cause."'1 But to
set cause up as something abstract, existing independently of the
motive of the contracting party, is to press strongly in the direction of common law consideration,'"' whereas the real beauty of
the civilian theory of cause is that it is not artificial but deals
10 2
with the very substance of agreement, the will itself.
The British Law Revision Committee in its Sixth Interim
Report moved unmistakably in the opposite direction in recommending (1) that an agreement shall be enforceable if the
promise or offer has been made in writing by the promisor or his
agent, or if it be supported by valuable consideration past or
present. This position was supported by reasoning that, "The
only justification for the doctrine of consideration at the present
day, it is said, is that it furnishes persuasive evidence of the intention of the parties concerned to create a binding obligation, but
it does not follow that consideration should be accepted as the
97. Cf. Billette, op. cit. supra note 9, at no 238.
98. Travaux de la Commission de RWforme du Code Civil 276 (1947-1948).
99. Id. at 272.
100. Id. at 273.
101. This is usually said to be Domat's theory, although he actually recognized cause in liberalities. See Domat, The Civil Law in its Natural Order
147-149 (Strahan, Cushing's ed. 1850). Cause abstraite and consideration are'
at one in supposedly being completely objective and taking no account of
motive.
The view attributed to Capitant actually begs the question. The cause of
a transaction does not result from, but determines, its type. If the quoted
statement means anything it is that if a person obligates himself to transfer
his property to another in return for a supposed obligation of the other to
pay a price for it but actually does not get such an obligation, or the price
itself, his own obligation is based on a false cause.
102. Cf. Viforeanu, op. cit. supra note 1, at no 131.
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sole test of such situations. This situation ought to be provable
by other and equally persuasive evidence such as, e.g. the fact
that the promisor has put his promise in writing. We agree with
this view, and we therefore recommend that consideration should
not be required in those cases in which the promise is in writing.
-This recommendation does not mean that a promise in writing
will be binding in every case. It will still be necessary for the
Court to find that the parties intended to create a binding obligation. Just as the presence of consideration today does not convert a social engagement into a-legal contract, so the presence of
writing will not convert a gratuitous promise into a legally binding one unless the Court determines that the parties intended
u0 3
it to be legally binding.'
Other expressions of similar views are not wanting, 10 4 and
it is particularly interesting to find that the draftsmen of the
proposed Uniform Commercial Code have provided, "An offer
by a merchant to buy or sell goods expressed in a signed writing
to be 'firm' or otherwise irrevocable for a period not exceeding
three months needs no consideration to be irrevocable during
that period." And by way of explanation it is said, "The purpose
of the section is to give effect to the deliberate intention of a
05
merchant to make a current firm offer binding.'
The emphasis in these proposals is laid unmistakably upon
giving greater effect to the will of the contractant-the basic
principle of French civilian law, and a principle clearly adopted
by the Civil Code of Louisiana. Upon the drafters of the proposed revision will rest the responsibility for giving this principle
the utmost consideration, whether they want to deal with it in
terms of cause or otherwise.
103. Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report 18, 31 .(1937).
104. Pound, op. cit. supra note 56, at 40; Sharp, Pacta sunt Servanda, 41
Col. L. Rev. 783 (1941); Mason, The Utility of Consideration-A Comparative
View, 41 Col. L. Rev. 825 (1941). Cf. Hays, Formal Contracts and Consideration, A Legislative Program, 41 Col. L. Rev. 849 (1941).
105. Uniform Commercial Code 67-68 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring
1950).

